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1.  Introduction 
In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or 
expression, of rules of customary international law.1 
A resolution adopted by an international organization … may provide evidence for establishing 
the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its 
development.2 
Some decades ago, Higgins carried out a major effort to describe how the political organs of the 
United Nations (‘UN’) fostered the development of customary international law (‘CIL’).3 On the 
one hand, Higgins emphasised the role of resolutions of political organs in clarifying and 
promoting the development of new CIL.4 On the other hand, she turned to the “methods by 
which states come to be bound by developing norms”.5 The present paper is mostly concerned 
with these ‘methods’.  
Higgins started by highlighting that “constitutional provisions and the practical realities” 
were important for “securing behavioural compliance”.6 Acknowledging that compliance was not 
the same as opinio juris, Higgins argued that there was a close relationship between the two 
concepts.7 Let us call this method, which affects compliance and opinio juris, as ‘Method I’. I argue 
that it is closely related to another method that she described, namely, the generation of “specific 
pressures to submit reports and information on certain matters”8 (‘Method II’). Further, Higgins 
emphasised the responsibility that falls upon members to cooperate in fulfilling the obligations 
arising from the Charter of the United Nations9 (‘Method III’). Likewise, she underlined the 
                                            
1 UN International Law Commission (‘ILC’), ‘Text of the draft conclusions on identification of customary 
international law adopted by the Commission’, in Report on the Work of the Sixty-Eighth Session, UN Doc 
A/71/10 (19 August 2016), 76 [62], Conclusion 4 (2). (Hereinafter ‘Draft Conclusions’) 
2 Ibid 78 [62] Conclusion 12 (2). 
3  R Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1963); R Higgins, ‘The Development of International Law by the Political 
Organs of the United Nations’ (1965) 59 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual 
Meeting (1921–1969) 116–24; R Higgins, ‘The United Nations and Lawmaking: The Political Organs’ 
(1970) 64 The American Journal of International Law 37–48. 
4 Higgins (1965), ibid 121. 
5 Ibid 123. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid 124. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid; Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter ‘Charter’). 
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“psychological pressure upon a government not to vote against a law-creating resolution if virtually 
all other states are likely to vote for it”10 (‘Method IV’). Besides, she underscored “the intermingling 
in resolutions of developing norms with well-established rules”11 (‘Method V’). These Methods 
broadly match similar descriptions that other scholars have made of the processes through which 
states change their behaviour and attitude or, technically, learn in international social processes.12 
Finally, in her book, Higgins mentioned the role of the subsidiary organs of the UN in promoting 
new law (‘Method VI’). In this latter respect, recalling the Congo Case, she asserted that “new 
institutional arrangements generate law and procedures”13 (which in a manner resonates with 
Method V). I argue that these ‘methods’ are mutually reinforcing and may be roughly organised as 
follows: Class A) Methods I to IV aim at changing the behaviour and attitude of states, notably 
through the generation of social pressure; and Class B) Methods V and VI aim at promoting the 
nascent norm through its institutionalisation, ie, its embedding in aggregates of norms and 
practices. As becomes clearer below, Class B Methods foster those in Class A.  
Indeed, institutionalisation of a norm has a great potential to affect the behaviour and 
attitude of states because, inter alia, it promotes the clarification of the norm, enhances compliance-
inducing mechanisms, and fosters participation of different states in the law-making activity, all of 
which create social pressure on resilient states. In a well-known text, Charney describes a modern 
process of customary law-making, which he calls “general international law”,14 and which he 
grounds on article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.15 Looking at the contribution 
of International Organizations (‘IOs’) towards the development of CIL, Charney argues that the 
creation of CIL has become “more structured … specially in the case of important normative 
developments”.16 In an attempt to systematise the description of the process of creation of CIL, 
                                            
10 Higgins (1965), above n 3, 124. Cf with A Wendt, ‘Collective identity formation and the international 
state’ (1994) 88(2) The American Political Science Review 384 (who argues that states “form identities by 
learning, through interaction, to see themselves as others do” and ‘the more significant these others are 
… the faster and deeper the process works”). 
11 Higgins (1965), above n 3, 124. 
12 J I Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87(4) American Journal of International Law 529–32. (The 
author asserts that “states collectively and severally maintain an interest in encouraging law-abiding 
behaviour” and that “fear of sanctions, the desire to be viewed by others as law-abiding, and domestic 
institutional inclinations to conform to rules denominated as law further impel states to comply”). 
Further, generally, see Wendt, above n 10, 384, (explaining that states learn their identities and interests 
in the social relations). 
13 Higgins (1965), above n 3, 4. 
14 Charney, above n 12, 546 (emphasis in original). 
15 Ibid: “The use of this label [general international law] appears to be consistent with article 38 … since 
‘international custom’ is only ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’” (emphasis in original).  
16 Ibid 543.  
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Charney proposes that a norm may emerge and gain strength in a multilateral forum before the 
norm’s diffusion and augmentation outside that forum. Indeed, he outlines the following order to 
these events: articulation of new norms in reports, resolutions, draft treaties etc; debate about the 
norm within the multilateral forum in question; communication to states present in the forum that 
the norm in question is intended to have legal character; diffusion of the norm to interested states 
outside the original forum; further debate about the norm that confirms “the normative status of 
the rule”;17 increasing voluntary compliance with the new norms that crystallises it as CIL.18 
Charney clearly asserts that this is a deliberative process very close to the legislative process in 
domestic systems.19  
What Charney describes may look like mere aspects of the law-making activity that occurs 
at the level of IOs. I prefer to look at the outline that he presents as a general depiction of a process 
of institutionalisation of international norms, and I am concerned with the effects that this process 
has on the strengthening of the norm and on the behaviour and attitude of the states. According 
to Charney, this new process is more democratic and more transparent than traditional customary 
law-making, and provides states with real opportunities to oppose the development of new 
norms;20 it is less amenable to abuses than traditional customary law-making;21 it allows for the 
effective communication that new norms are under consideration;22 it may replace traditional 
customary law-making in respect to “matters with pronounced lawmaking potential”23 and in 
matters of technical character,24 and its outcomes are “endowed with substantial legitimacy, 
creating a strong pull toward compliance”.25 What is more, this process “greatly extends the 
international community’s ability to clarify the intended scope and applicability of the norm under 
consideration”.26  
From one perspective, both Higgins’ ‘methods’ and, notably Charney’s process of law-
making of ‘general international law’ may be studied on the assumption that IOs are mere agents 
                                            
17 Ibid 546. 
18 Ibid 543–546 
19 Ibid 547. Cf with J E Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
594 (arguing that the process “approximates the intentional process involved in treaty-making”) and, 
generally, chapters 3, 4, and 10. 
20 Charney, above n 12, 547. See below nn 79, 82 and accompanying text. 
21 Ibid 548. See below nn 82, 94 and accompanying text. 
22 Ibid 549. See below nn 91–97 and 129–131 and accompanying text. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 550. See below nn 28 to 30 and accompanying text. See below Section 2.1.1. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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of the states.27 However, this understanding overlooks the intensity of the behavioural and 
attitudinal changes that these ‘methods’ and ‘new law-making’ often inflict on states. In contrast, 
I suggest that we approach these ‘methods’ and ‘new law-making’ as interconnected social processes 
in which states continually learn to identify themselves, redefine their interests in respect to specific 
problems and, consequently, adopt new norms of behaviour. I argue that, from this second 
perspective, the analysis sheds light on the manners through which IOs promote the formation of 
CIL. Specifically, in the present article, I place focus on the processes of institutionalisation of 
emerging norms of CIL through the work of the political and subsidiary organs of the UN, and 
on the effects of this institutionalisation on the norms and on the states. As it develops, 
institutionalisation clarifies the scope of the norm and of its application; it improves mechanisms 
of persuasion, as well as enhances the monitoring of levels of compliance with the norm, thereby 
increasing cultural and social pressure on resilient states; in addition, it may promote the 
specialisation of the norm as a legal rule of CIL. As I explain below, resolutions and activities are an 
important part of processes of institutionalisation of new norms. 
Before proceeding, it is critical to provide the contours of the contexts that are at the core 
of the subject of research. These are contexts in which the identities and interests of states are not 
stabilised and through which institutions experience ongoing change. In the present-day world, it 
is reasonable to assume that the institutions, as well as the individual and collective identities and 
interests of states, at least in respect to human rights and international security—also on themes 
such as environment and climate change law and certain aspects of international economic law—
are far from stable.28 Moreover, these and similar topics require specialised knowledge and 
collective responses. This scenario affects the emergence of new norms in the field, and provides 
renewed opportunity for international organisations and certain non-state actors (‘NSAs’), to 
influence the formation of new norms. Their participation in these processes has already been the 
                                            
27 Ibid (acknowledging that international organs do not have “independent legislative authority”). 
28 See, for instance, R Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the 
Pentagon (Simon and Schuster, 2016); N Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (Simon 
and Schuster, 2014); J Rapley, Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion and How it all Went Wrong 
(Simon and Schuster, 2017). The authors describe what—I submit—can be defined as the building of 
collective identities: cf with E Adler and M Barnett (ed), Security Communities, 62 Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially chapters 2 and 12. Also, illustrating 
the instability international institutions face; Munich Security Conference, ‘Munich Security Report 
2017, Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?’ (23 February 2017) 
<https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/munich-security-report-
2017/>. 
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subject of scholarly work.29 I argue that, in many cases, their participation is a necessary condition 
for the norm to emerge and develop.30 Because of the instability of the context, the need of 
specialised knowledge and of collective responses, IOs offer focal points for the definition of 
problems, and articulation and promotion of new behaviours and attitudes—making the process 
of learning by states less traumatic. Furthermore, this instability has a clear impact on the organs 
of states and IOs involved in fomenting new norms, as the organs may face sharp criticism and 
challenges on grounds of lack of mandate or legitimacy. Again, IOs, through their procedures, can 
absorb these pressures and respond to them through the improvement and fine-tuning of the 
scope of the norms and procedures for their implementation. To address the formation of CIL in 
these contexts, the present work distances itself from the principal-agent theory that reduces IOs 
to agents of states, and from traditional rationalist approaches, which may provide good 
explanations of norm- and institution-formation in contexts in which the identities and interests 
of states are relatively stable.  
This paper thus draws on the constructivist school,31 as well as on the constructivist-
institutionalist school,32 and combines them with Hartian approaches to international law.33 The 
                                            
29 J d’Aspremont, Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in 
International Law (Taylor and Francis, 2011). 
30 What comes to mind is the important role that the International Committee of the Red Cross performed 
in promoting rules of humanitarian law. See J M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
31 J T Checkel, ‘The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory’ (1998) 50 World Politics 324–
327. (The author explains that neoliberalism and neorealism [which rest on rationalist grounds] are 
“agent-centred views” that “assert that all social phenomena are explicable in ways that involve only 
individual agents and their goals and actions; the starting point of the analysis is actors (states) with 
given properties. Ontologically, the result is to reduce one unit of analysis—structures—to the other—
agents”. He further notes that “constructivists do not reject science or causal explanation; their quarrel 
with mainstream theories is ontological, not epistemological”. Furthermore, for constructivists, the 
effects of norms “reach deeper: they constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate 
behaviour”). Also, S Droubi, ‘The Role of the United Nations in the Formation of Customary 
International Law in the Field of Human Rights’ (2017) 19(1) International Community Law Review 68–97. 
32 See C Hay, ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ in Sarah A Binder, R A W Rhodes, and Bert A Rockman 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2008) 57 et seq. The author 
explains that “constructivist institutionalists were motivated by the desire to capture, describe, and 
interrogate institutional disequilibrium. As such, rational choice and normative/sociological 
institutionalism, which rely albeit for rather different reasons on the assumption of equilibrium, were 
theoretical non-starters” (emphasis in original).  
33 See J  d’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’ (2012), in J 
Kammerhofer and J d’Aspremont (eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 114–50. (Drawing on Hart, d’Aspremont puts forward a dynamic theory of the 
sources of international law, which, inter alia, “helps show that cognising international law necessitates a 
theory of sources that is not static, but can rather evolve together with the social practice of law-applying 
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paper firstly describes how institutionalisation works in the development of CIL (section 2). Then, 
in section 3, it shows how organs of the UN participate in the processes of institutionalisation of 
new CIL. Section 4 concludes. 
2. International institutions and the formation of CIL 
This section first clarifies some aspects of the terminology employed in the present work. Then, 
section 2.1 looks at institutionalisation of nascent CIL. Section 2.2 builds on section 2.1 and unveils 
fundamental aspects that allow section 3 to ascertain the role of UN resolutions and activities in 
promoting institutionalisation of new CIL.  
Norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for a given identity.34 These standards could 
have a strict or general character (constituting, respectively, rules and principles).35 In the present 
text, rules and principles (to which I will refer indistinctively as rules)36 refer to norms that undergo 
the process of legal institutionalisation and that, consequently, can be formally articulated as legal 
rules.37 Hence, the words—‘rules’ and ‘legal rules’—are used indistinctively. Moreover, 
institutionalisation can be defined as the process of embedding new norms in coherent aggregates 
of norms and practices.38 This concept of institutionalisation presupposes that institutions are 
aggregates of norms and practices.39 However, this definition requires further clarification, 
specifically, on the degree of formalisation of institutions.40 Roughly speaking, at the lower level 
of formalisation, there are what can be identified as ‘arrangements’;41 at the mid-level, there are 
                                            
authorities”, which is crucial for the theory that the present work articulates). See below n 66 and 
accompanying text. 
34 Droubi, above n 31, 71–72. See A Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms’ (1996) 40 International 
Studies Quarterly 363; M Finnemore and K Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ 
(1998) 52 International Organization 887; M Finnemore, ‘Are Legal Norms Distinctive?’ (1999) 32 NYU 
Journal of  Internationall Law and Politics 699. 
35 Droubi, above n 31, 71–2. 
36 Similarly, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 81, Conclusion 1, Commentary [2]. 
37 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2009) 24: “We 
have arrived at the idea of a rule, that is, and explicitly articulated norm … The case here is one in which 
the explicit articulation is made by a person who has a position of authority”.  
38 Droubi, above  n 31, 70. 
39 R O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University 
Press, 2005) 5; R O Keohane, International Institutions And State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 
(Westview Press, 1989) 383. 
40 R O Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’ (1988) 32(4) International Studies Quarterly 
379–396; J Goldstein et al, ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’ (2000) 54 International 
Organization 385–392. 
41 See MacCormick, above n 37, 35–36. 
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‘agencies’42 or ‘entities’43 or ‘organs’, and at the top, there are—I submit—political and judicial 
organs that often occupy the highest levels of their respective bureaucracies. The latter two 
categories of institutions display increasingly rigid politico-legal mandates and processes of 
decision-making and enforcement—as well as stable financial conditions.44 In contrast with 
informal institutions and lower-level organs, higher-level organs are less amenable to significant 
changes. Consequently, these organs may be more resistant to the emergence of norms, notably if 
such norms seriously challenge the status-quo—than informal institutions and lower-level organs. 
As I explain below, this does not prevent lower-level organs from creating pressure on higher-
level organs to adopt emerging norms, which may generate a process of progressive strengthening 
of the norms. In the present work, to avoid confusion, I employ the term ‘organ’ or ‘international 
organ’, instead of ‘agencies’ or ‘entities’.45 I may also refer to it by its name: General Assembly 
(‘GA’ or ‘UNGA’), Security Council (‘SC’ or ‘UNSC’), Secretary-General (‘SG’ or ‘UNSG’), 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’), Sanctions Committees, inter alia.  
 
2.1.  Progressive institutionalisation of nascent CIL 
In their day-to-day affairs in the international sphere, to attain their respective objectives and carry 
out their respective mandates, organs of states and IOs articulate, promote, and use new norms. 
As mentioned, this process is cost-effective because it facilitates learning by states.46 It is often the 
case that, only after a norm has crystallised as a rule of CIL, an observer is capable of discerning, 
with the benefit of hindsight, that the first articulation of the norm by a given organ was crucial 
for the evolution of the norm, and that the use of the norm by different organs in different places 
was crucial for its crystallisation as CIL. As these processes evolve they leave traces of different 
kinds: scholars and practitioners regard these traces as evidence of the formation and existence of 
CIL.47 What follows is an outline of the different processes involved in the formation of CIL. This 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
43 Keohane, above n 40, 382–384. 
44 J G Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’ (1975) 29 International 
Organization 557–569; J G Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’ (1982) 36 International Organization 308–379; S D Krasner, 
‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ (1982) 36 International 
Organization 185. 
45 The term agency has a specific meaning in the Charter articles 57–59. 
46 Missing the potential that this ‘new form’ of ‘generation’ of CIL has, to spare states from the traumatic 
process of learning through mistakes (which too often involved resort to violence), Dupuy referred to 
the “modern” process as coutoume sauvage. See R J Dupuy, ‘Coutume Sage et Coutume Sauvage’ in La 
Communauté Internationale: Mélanges Offerts À Charles Rousseau  (A Pedon, 1974) 75–77. 
47 Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 91, 99, Conclusions 6(2), 10(2). 
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outline highlights institutions that push the norm forward. The account roughly follows the stages 
of emergence, cascade, and internalisation in the formation of a norm.48 
 
2.1.1.  Emergence  
Specialised organs of states (such as national meteorological and hydrological services) and IOs 
(the Commission for Climatology of the World Meteorological Organization) are mandated with 
the task of addressing specific realities. They transform information into knowledge and define 
problems, frame solutions, and articulate prescriptions of behaviour.49 For instance, the organs 
above were involved with the definition of anthropomorphic climate change as a problem, and 
the articulation and promotion of new prescriptions of behaviour for states to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases.50 In reality, not only national meteorological services but also other actors 
(eg, scholars, organisations of both national and international character) were responsible for the 
definition of climate change as problem that required a range of responses. Hence, the theory 
articulated in the present paper reflects only part of a very complex, decentralised and fragmented 
reality, which has been the object of different studies.51 Nevertheless, the contribution of non-state 
actors, whether domestic or not, are beyond the scope of the present article.  
                                            
48 Finnemore and Sikkink, above n 34. 
49 In respect to IOs, see the landmark study M Barnett and M Finnemore, Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004) 29–31 (The authors argue that IOs are 
bureaucracies that enjoy autonomy and authority notably by controlling knowledge, ie, by providing 
meaning to raw information. Hence, they exercise power in respect to states and non-state actors, ie, 
they are capable of shaping the ability of those actors to “determine their own circumstances and fate”. 
They not only “manipulate incentives to shape the behavior of those actors”, but they also are capable 
of creating, defining and mapping social realities in which the interests of states are constructed. The 
authors identify three mechanisms through which IOs regulate and constitute the world: they “classify 
the world, creating categories of problems, actors and action; fix meaning in the social world; and 
articulate and diffuse new norms and rules”). 
50 See, generally, World Meteorological Organization, Proceedings of the World Climate Conference—A Conference 
of Experts on Climate and Mankind. Geneva 12–13 February 1979, WMO No 537 (20 February 2017) 
<http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_537_en.pdf>, notably at 713–714 (inter alia, representatives 
of national meteorological services were present at the Conference, whose outcome, in the form of a 
formal declaration, clearly defined that “Man [sic] today inadvertently modifies climate on a local scale 
and to a limited extent on a regional scale. There is serious concern that the continued expansion of 
man’s activities on earth may cause significant extended regional and even global changes in climate”). 
51 Notably, the incipient theory on regime complexes helps explaining the role of different actors, 
including domestic organs and civil society, in the development of international regimes (K Raustiala 
and D G Victor, ‘The regime complex for plant genetic resources’ (2004) 58(2) International Organization 
277–309; R O Keohane and D G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9(1) 
Perspectives on Politics 7–23; A Orsini, J F Morin, and O Young, ‘Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or 
a Boost for Global Governance?’ (2013) 19(1) Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
DROUBI, INSTITUTIONALISATION OF EMERGING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 
Given their mandate, very often the members of state organs are experts. In performing 
these tasks, organs of states and IOs often operate together, and are orientated towards problem-
solving. In general, they have much room to devise new solutions. Consequently, their 
recommendations, when proposing new prescriptions of behaviour, may challenge the 
predominant expectations of the international community. For instance, many countries strongly 
resisted agreeing to any obligation to reduce industrial emissions by invoking their sovereignty.52 
Because new prescriptions of behaviour arise within institutions, prescriptions carry with them the 
ethos of these institutions. On the one hand, this fact allows the new prescription to draw from 
the legitimacy of their original institutions; on the other, however, this fact frames the possible 
development of the prescription. In other words, institutionalisation is path-dependent: each move 
forward depends on the prior move, and frames possible future moves.53 Hence, the importance 
of the original institution must not be underestimated.  
Furthermore, prescriptions of behaviour are not necessarily norms. The latter “embody a 
quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment, prompting justification for action”.54 In other 
words, the norm emerges as the sense, that the prescription ought to be observed within the 
international community of States, crystallises.55 Note that the articulation of the prescription, by 
(specialised) organs of states and IOs working in coordination, helps in explaining why learning 
by states has become faster and less traumatic in contrast to the ‘old form’ of generation of CIL. 
Further, one particular actor becomes important in the promotion of the prescription as a norm; 
                                            
Organizations 27–39). Some of these studies have also contributed a transnational analysis (K W Abbott, 
‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30(4) Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 571–590). In any case, regime complexes theories place focus on regimes and 
governance. They provide only partial relief for the study of the development of norms, which makes 
clear that further studies are necessary to understand how these theories may contribute for the 
ascertainment of the role that domestic state and non-state actors have in the formation of international 
norms. 
52 M Betsill, ‘Environmental NGOs meet the sovereign state: The Kyoto protocol negotiations on global 
climate change’ (2002) 13 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 13, 49. 
53 J G March et al, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’ (1998) 52 International 
Organization 943. Similarly, Alvarez, above n 19, 265.  
54 Finnemore and Sikkink, above n 34, 892. 
55 Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 87, Conclusion 3, Commentary [9]: “While in the 
identification of a rule of customary international law the existence of a general practice is often the 
initial factor to be considered, and only then an inquiry is made into whether such general practice is 
accepted as law, this order of inquiry is not mandatory. The identification of a rule of customary 
international law may also begin with appraising a written test or statement allegedly expressing a certain 
legal conviction and then seeking to verify whether there is a general practice corresponding to it”.  
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the norm-entrepreneur.56 This having been said, it is important to note that another class of organs 
and institutions often intervene in the process that leads to the emergence of a norm in the 
international community of states—namely, organs and institutions that occupy the highest levels 
of their respective bureaucracy.57 Because they represent their respective states and IOs, it is 
possible to affirm that such states and IOs have formally adopted the norm. Hence, at this very 
incipient stage, technical institutions and organs, norm-entrepreneurs and political organs 
intervene to push the norm forward to the next stages. 
 
2.1.2.  Cascade  
The first group of states that support the norm constitute the ‘leading states’, which are important 
because they create social pressure on other states. Consequently, in different states and IOs, 
organs and institutions intervene by adopting the new norm. This process accelerates the 
clarification of the scope of the norm and the promotion of its implementation. Leading states 
become concerned about securing compliance from other states and, to that end, they adopt a 
more specialised language and employ more specialised institutions. Their argumentation in favour 
of the norm becomes marked by the use of legal topoi,58 forcing resilient states to resort to legal 
argumentation as well. Likewise, leading states promote the insertion of the norm into formal 
institutions designed to induce compliance with the norm. As language and institutionalisation 
become highly specialised, it becomes possible to identify a nascent rule of law. In some cases, it 
is clear that a rule of law has emerged. For instance, states may decide to enter into a treaty that 
                                            
56 Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 90 Conclusion 4(3), Commentary [9]: “the acts of private 
individuals may also sometimes be relevant, but only to the extent that States have endorsed or reacted 
to them”. See Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. 
57 This is not meant to resuscitate the “older position, according to which only the actions of those 
designated to represent the state externally (“international organs of a State”) may count as State 
practice”, which “is no longer generally accepted” (M Wood, ‘Second Report on Identification of 
Customary International Law’, UN Doc A/CN 4/672 (22 May 2014) 17). Rather, this is meant to 
suggest that the involvement of the organs that occupy the highest levels of the state bureaucracy is 
often necessary to show that the actions in question are performed out of a belief that there is an 
international norm requiring them. Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 90, Conclusion 5, 
Commentary  [2] (“The conduct of any State organ is to be considered conduct of that State, whether 
the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in 
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a 
territorial unit of the State”) and 92, Conclusion 6, Commentary [6] (“Decisions of national courts at all 
levels may count as State practice (though it is likely that greater weight will be given to the higher 
courts”)). However, see below n 90 and accompanying text. 
58 Cf with F V Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 38–41, 218–219, 234–235. 
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sets forth the rule and establishes a monitoring mechanism of compliance.59 In other cases, such 
as that of CIL, further confirmation of lawfulness is necessary. Hence, at the cascade stage, political 
and technical institutions in different states and IOs, which are capable of inducing compliance 
with the norm, intervene. As language becomes increasingly formalised, states and IOs issue 
formal declarations supporting or rejecting the new rule. 
 
2.1.3. Internalisation  
It is crucial to examine the concept of internalisation. Finnemore and Sikkink emphasised the total 
internalisation of norms by the state, and consequently they placed it at the end of the norm 
cascade.60 In contrast, the concept of internalisation that I adopt emphasises the progressive 
internalisation of the norm as a rule of law,61 and considers the importance of international and 
domestic organs and institutions in pushing other organs of a given state to adopt the norm, in a 
manner that makes the practice and opinio juris of the state in question progressively clear.62 
Governments may do so by affirming the norm as a rule of law through statements and favourable 
voting at different fora, diplomatic acts and communications, and the signing and ratification of 
treaties. Moreover, they may direct lower organs to comply with and implement the rule, in which 
case the latter is implemented on the ground. Parliaments may also incorporate the rule into 
domestic legislation and courts and tribunals, enforce it through judicial mechanisms. Note, 
however, that internalisation of the norm begins at a much earlier stage, ie, at the emergence stage, 
when the norm was nothing more than a prescription. This is because the technical organs 
involved at the earlier stage were likely to be in contact with their equivalents from other countries 
and from IOs. In other words, in this perspective, lower institutions promote the formal 
                                            
59 Finnemore and Sikkink,  above  n 34, 900. 
60 Ibid 904–905: “At the extreme of a norm cascade, norms may become so widely accepted that they are 
internalised by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the norm 
almost automatic. For this reason, internalised norms can be both extremely powerful (because 
behaviour according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously 
consider or discuss whether to conform). Precisely because they are not controversial, however, these 
norms are often not the centrepiece of political debate and for that reason tend to be ignored by political 
scientist”. In the same vein, see Droubi,  above n 31, 84–85. 
61 Similarly, H H Koh, ‘Internalization through Socialization’ (2005) 54(4) Duke Law Journal 975. 
62 See above n 57 and accompanying text. 
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internalisation of the norm by the elite organs of the state.63 Evidently, while this process is in flux, 
it is difficult, if at all possible, to distinguish a uniform practice of the state.64 
 
2.1.4.  Late cascade  
As the process evolves into late cascade, a specific class of actors, international legal authorities 
(or legal officials) such as courts and tribunals, renowned jurists, professional associations,65 may 
be able to affirm the new norm is CIL, to strongly suggest that it is CIL, or simply to employ it as CIL.66 
From an analytical standpoint, the authority works in different manners. Formally, it gives closure 
to past processes because it ascertains the existence of a rule of CIL, which is typically a law-
applying activity. Moreover, the affirmation of the authority—that a rule is CIL—may shed light 
on a reality—the rule is CIL—that had not been clear to all states.67 In this case, the affirmation 
makes it possible for States to see the rule in question as CIL, which in turn strengthens the rule. 
Hence, the affirmation may have a performative effect on the behaviour and attitude of states.68 
                                            
63 Evidently, there are alternative routes as the elite may force a new norm down to state institutions and 
civil society. See J T Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’ (2001) 55 
International Organization 553. 
64 Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 93, Conclusion 7(2), Commentary [4]: “where different 
organs or branches within the State adopt different courses of conduct on the same matter or the 
practice of one organ varies over time” the practice of the state is inconsistent and its “contribution to 
the ‘general practice’ element may be reduced or even nullified”. In contrast, see the statement made by 
Shinya Murase: “paragraph 2 … appeared to disregard the fact that it was quite normal within 
democratic countries for State organs to express conflicting views”, in ‘Provisional Summary Record of 
the 3223rd Meeting’, ILC 66th sess, 2nd pt, 3223rd mtg, UN Doc A/CN 4/SR 3223 (15 July 2014) 10.  
65 The concept is borrowed from Tamanaha: “a ‘legal’ official is whomever, as a matter or social practice, 
members of the group (including legal officials themselves) identify and treat as ‘legal officials’”. B Z 
Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press, 2001) 14. Also, 
d’Aspremont, above n 29. Similarly, M S McDougal, ‘Law and Peace’ (1989) 18 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 1–2. 
66 Drawing on the dynamic theory of the sources of international law (see above n 33), I argue that the 
possibility of affirming that a rule is CIL depends on the evolution of the ‘feeling’ that legal authorities 
share about what CIL is and about how it must be ascertained. Furthermore, I submit that the 
institutionalisation of the evolving norm affects legal authorities as much it affects states. 
67 Reviewing Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, Charney explained 
that the ICJ affirmed that CIL required certain behaviours from states; however, he concluded: “None 
of these requirements was clearly articulated and known to the international community prior to the 
Court’s declaration. Nevertheless, these rules were found to be public international law”: Charney, above 
n 12, 537. 
68 Similarly, I Venzke, ‘The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Developers of the Law: 
Working out the Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation’ (2011) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Review 99. On performative speech, see generally J L Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words (Oxford University Press, 1975); J R Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 
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Furthermore, the authority may frame the future development of the norm.69 This latter case 
becomes salient in situations in which the affirmation that a given rule is CIL is premature, and 
attracts support as much as it triggers opposition—as the affirmation made by the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, that terrorism is a crime in international law, evidences.70 I argue that the first 
authoritative affirmation or affirmations of the norm as CIL tend to constitute a landmark 
phenomenon that seemingly closes the early stages of the formation of the norm. Further, I submit 
that the first affirmations of CIL are on the blurred lines between law-making and law-applying. 
Hence, at late cascade, highly specialised institutions, like judicial and quasi-judicial organs, 
intervene in support of the norm. 
I also argue that UN organs and institutions are important participants in the processes 
above. However, in order to properly understand their role, it is necessary to recall some 
fundamental aspects of formation of CIL. 
 
2.2.  Aspects of fundamental importance for understanding the role of international organs 
and institutions in the life-cycle of a norm 
First, I emphasise that the predominant understanding is that a rule is CIL if it is grounded in the 
behaviour and attitude (opinio juris) of states.71 Despite its normative significance, this definition 
only guides the practice of ascertaining the existence of CIL. Indeed, although the two elements 
are formally necessary for the rule to constitute CIL,72 often it is not possible, notably at the earlier 
stages of formation of the CIL (emergence and early cascade), to clearly distinguish one from the 
                                            
(Cambridge University Press, 1969). On a different perspective, P Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward 
a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1986) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805. The latter clearly derives the force 
of performative speech from the social authority of the speaker. 
69 Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 110, Conclusion 13, Commentary [3]: “judicial 
pronouncements on the state of customary international law do not freeze the development of the law, 
rules of customary international law may have evolved since the date of a particular decision”. Also, 
above n 53 and accompanying text. 
70 Droubi, above n 31, 80 [59]. 
71 Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, Conclusion 2: “To determine the existence and content of a rule 
of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is 
accepted as law”. Also important: acceptance of the norm is “required only by the international 
community and not by all individual states”: Charney, above n 12, 536. 
72 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) 
(Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 44 [77]: “Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, 
but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice 
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”. Similarly, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc 
A/71/10, 83, Conclusion 2 and Commentary [2]. 
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other.73 They arise as a single reality and must be ascertained together.74 Likewise, at these stages, 
opinio juris shows itself as an (individual and collective) attitude that is favourable to the full 
emergence of the rule (notably, at early cascade),75 and this progressively acquires more salience as 
the new norm becomes part of more specialised institutions (internalisation and late cascade). 
Insofar as resilient states learn to understand certain realities as problems (late emergence, early 
cascade), and accept that they need to change their behaviour to tackle these problems, new 
attitudes emerge.   
Second, formation of new CIL is markedly a political process, which progressively acquires 
legal character.76 I argue that at the stages of emergence and early cascade of new CIL, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to clearly distinguish between the political (or moral: the non-law) and 
the law.77 Moreover, even at mature stages, “political considerations must be taken into account 
                                            
73 Droubi, above n 31, 78 et seq; Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 83, Conclusion 2, 
Commentary [3]: “where the existence of a general practice accepted as law cannot be established, the 
conclusion will be that the alleged rule of customary international law does not exist”. 
74 Droubi, above n 31, 78: “rather than assessing whether the practice of organs of one state is uniform in 
supporting the norm, the appropriate exercise for the ascertainment of the formation of a customary 
international legal rule requires an assessment of the reasons for actions taken by the different organs”. 
Cf with Colombian-Peruvian Asylum (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 277: “The facts brought to the 
knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and 
discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, 
there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by 
some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of 
political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and 
uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification 
of the offence”. 
75 See Droubi, above n 31, 81 et seq. 
76 Charney, above n 12, 539: “Customary law results from political decisions to take the steps necessary 
to form a rule”. 
77 Castañeda employs the expression “quasi-legal” to describe the “amorphous and mobile reality of this 
legal sector”, in which “there are no tangible, clear, juridical criteria to demarcate with precision the 
zones of binding force”: J Castañeda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (Columbia University Press, 
1969) 176. Similarly, Alvarez, above n 19, 258: “Although the doctrine of article 38 sources recognises 
no “in-between” category in terms of legally binding effect, this is the category in which much of the 
regulatory work of these IOs fits”. More recently, there have been significant developments that permit 
a better understanding of this “amorphous and mobile reality”. Judge Simma differentiated between 
degrees of non-prohibition: See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, 478–481 especially at [9] (Declaration of Judge 
Simma). S Droubi, ‘Transnational Corporations and International Human Rights Law’ (2015) 6 Notre 
Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 131–132.  Also, MacCormick, above n 37, 103 et seq (the 
author differentiates between Wrong and Not-Wrong). Finally, F Johns, Non-Legality in International 
Law—Unruly Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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when interpreting ambiguous or imprecise rules”.78 Hence, the ascertainment of CIL is a politico-
legal process. This constitutes another challenge for practitioners and authorities to strictly follow 
the definition of CIL when ascertaining the existence of CIL. Indeed, the legitimate affirmation of 
a norm as CIL does not require that legal authority carries out a sociological observation of the 
general behaviour and attitude of states.79 The authority will often ascertain the behaviour of some 
states and through normative reasoning give meaning to the behaviour of the others (eg, when the 
authority identifies acquiescence). Besides, the authority will often analyse their behaviour within 
the specific contexts and infer their attitude (opinio juris).80 Moreover, the authority will occupy itself 
of the behaviour and attitude of the main organs of the state—it will rarely attend to the behaviour 
of lower organs and, least of all, domestic non-state actors.81 Evidently, this causes a legitimacy 
deficit, as many states, and many domestic institutions within the same state, remain at the margins 
of the process.82 
Further, collective expectations and social pressure may function either to strengthen or to 
weaken the potential of the emerging norm to evolve into CIL. Indeed, both Higgins and 
Johnstone show the weight that collective expectations have on the work of norm-entrepreneurs, 
ie, individuals who promote new norms.  Recalling Schachter and Hammarskjöld,83 Higgins 
observed that the Secretary-General cannot depart too radically from the expectations of the 
community.84 That is exactly the same conclusion that Johnstone reached many decades later after 
a detailed examination of a case study in which the Secretary-General performed the role of a 
                                            
78 Higgins (1963), above n 3, 9. 
79 Droubi, above n 31, 82–83. Likewise, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 98 [186]: “The Court does not consider that, for a 
rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule … the Court deems it sufficient tha the conduct of States should, in general, 
be consistent with such rules”. See below n 94 and accompanying text. 
80 A A d’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press, 1971) 85. (The author 
reviews the Lotus case and concludes that the ICJ inferred “the subjective attitude on the part of the 
states concerned”, arguing that although “substantially questionable”, inference constitutes a “technique 
of proof of custom that is significant”. Similarly, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 84, Conclusion 2, 
Commentary [5]. See below n 93 and accompanying text. 
81 Droubi, above n 31, 84–85 (The level of internalisation is, in sociological terms, that of the “elites of 
the state”). 
82 For all, J Castañeda, ‘The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law’ (1961) 
15 International Organization 38. 
83 See O Schachter, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld and the Relation of Law to Politics’ (1962) 56 The American Journal 
of International Law 1–6. Also, see the landmark study by the same author: ‘The Development of 
International Law through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat’ (1948) 25 British 
Yearbook of International Law 91. 
84 Higgins, above n 3, (1963) 8. 
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norm-entrepreneur.85 Consequently, it is often the case that norms, which depart significantly from 
the expectations of the community, require more time to crystallise. Indeed, in a well-known text, 
Lauterpatch suggests that the period for the crystallisation of new CIL is proportionate to the 
degree and intensity of the change.86 Fitzmaurice adds that the passage of “an appreciable period 
of time” is essential if emerging rights are contrary to established law.87 However, this rule-of-
thumb, requiring more time depending on the degree and intensity of change, does not seem to 
stand the test of unstable environments, notably when new CIL emerges from or is pushed 
forward by rapid onset events that trigger a general change of attitude.88 A case study on the impact 
that terrorist attacks in the US and other Western States in the 2000s had on the acceleration of 
the crystallisation of the prohibition of terrorism as CIL may illustrate this point.   
                                            
85 I Johnstone, ‘The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur’ in Simon Chesterman (ed), Secretary or 
General?: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 123–138. 
86 H Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty over Submarine Areas’ (1950) 27 British Yearbook of International Law 
393: “A ‘consistent and uniform usage practiced by the States in question’—to use the language of the 
International Court of Justice in the Asylum case—can be packed within a short space of years. The 
‘evidence of a general practice as law’—in the words of article 38 of the Statute—need not be spread 
over decades. Any tendency to exact a prolonged period for the crystallisation of custom must be 
proportionate to the degree and the intensity of the change that it purports, or is asserted, to effect”.  
87 G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: General 
Principles and Sources of Law’ (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law 31: “the acquisition of 
prescriptive rights by individual States, contrary to the existing (and otherwise still subsisting) 
international order, involves different considerations and criteria, that make the passage of time, and of 
an appreciable period of time at that, essential at any rate in all those cases (which are the type of the 
true prescriptive or historic claim) where the positive consent or express recognition of States cannot 
be shown”.  
88 The important criterion seems to constitute that put forward by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 
3, 43 [74]: “Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to 
the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely 
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short 
though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should 
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;- and should 
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved”. Moreover, see ibid 242, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sorensen, 244: “The 
convention may serve as an authoritative guide for the practice of States faced with the relevant new 
legal problems, and its provisions thus become the nucleus around which a new set of generally 
recognised legal rules may crystallise. The word ‘custom’, with its traditional time connotation, may not 
even be an adequate expression for the purpose of describing this particular source of law”. In the same 
vein, Alvarez, above n 19. 
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In the informal process of creation of CIL, is there any formal act that may indicate the 
move from politics to law?  d’Amato drew on the concept of ‘promulgative communication’89 
when he proposed the concept of promulgative articulation: ie, articulation that gives notice to states 
that their “actions and decisions will have legal implications” so states may “be able to freely decide 
whether or not to pursue various policies, knowing that their acts may create or modify 
international law”.90 Which ‘legal implications’? Unfortunately, the formalist approach adopted by 
d’Amato misses some of them. 
I argue that promulgative articulation involves the use of the norm in contexts that suggests 
to states that their behaviour, in respect to the norm, may be described and should be justified in 
legal terms. In other words, it permits that leading states and IOs ascertain the behaviour of 
resilient states pursuant to legal topoi and, notably, principles of law.91 Legal topoi profoundly mark 
legal reasoning and argumentation,92 and they provide the lenses through which the behaviour of 
noncompliant states are likely to be ascertained. Principles of law foster the generation of CIL, by 
providing a material behaviour with legal meaning.93 Hence, silence may trigger acquiescence with 
                                            
89 M S McDougal, H D Lasswell, W M Reisman, ‘The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative 
Decision’ (1967) 19 Journal of Legal Education 253–424: “Processes of prescription occur in a wide variety 
of situations and the degree of institutionalisation of the various component processes of prescription 
varies greatly. The sequence of a completed process of prescription is: (i) initiation; (ii) exploration of 
potentially relevant facts and policies; (iii) formulation, that is the characterization of the facts and 
policies accepted as relevant; and (iv) promulgative communication of the prescriptive content to the target 
audience (emphasis added)”. 
90 D’Amato, above n 80, 75. D’Amato made it clear that “third parties” could participate in the 
promulgation of the rule: “But it must be promulgated in a place which nation-state officials and their 
counsel would have reason to consult”; ibid 85. Similarly, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 98, 
Conclusion 9, Commentary [5]: “[states in a position to react to a practice] must be shown to have 
understood the practice as being in accordance with customary international law”. Also, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 109 [207]: “Either the States 
taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence 
of belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it’” (emphasis 
added). Moreover, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 99 Conclusion 10(3) and Commentary [1], [4], 
and [7]. Furthermore, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia 
v Singapore) (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 50–51 [121]: “silence may also speak, but only if the conduct 
of the other State calls for a response”.  Note how the present aspect subtlety relates to above n 80 and 
accompanying text. 
91 Kratochwil, above n 58, 39 (the author notes that legal topoi justify the exlusion of many “practical 
arguments” in a “discourse on grievances” and limit the “range of relevant facts and proofs”). Similarly, 
d’Amato, above n 80, 175. 
92 See, generally, T Viehweg and L Díez-Picazo, Tópica y Jurisprudencia (Thomson-Civitas, 2007). 
Kratochwil,  above n 58, 218–219. 
93 See R Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (with special reference to good faith)’ (2006) 53 
Netherlands International Law Review 1–7. 
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the new norm;94 material compliance, ie, compliance resulting from social pressure and not 
accompanied by the belief that the norm is law, may activate the principle of equitable estoppel.95 
The latter principle may be activated by strong statements that may not be accompanied by the 
willingness to comply, that is, by ‘cheap talk’. However, this case unveils other factors of politico-
legal character that make it difficult for the state not to meet word with deed.96 Finally, I submit 
that promulgative articulation may involve one specific phenomenon, namely, the inversion of the 
burden of proof in favour of the norm.97 Thenceforth, resilient states will face pressure to justify 
their behaviour (similar to what occurs through Higgins’ Methods I and II). 
Higgins argues that the political organs of the UN are “vitally concerned” with the 
development of CIL.98 Insofar as the organs operate within a normative structure (in this case, the 
main element of this structure is the Charter) and seek to attain the objectives ascribed to them in 
their respective mandates; they work under specific worldviews, promote understandings that 
match their worldviews, and demote others that do not. The problems that they define, the norms 
that they articulate and promote, they do so pursuant to their worldviews. This, by itself, 
strengthens certain norms and weakens others.99 The embedding of a norm (eg, prohibition of 
terrorism) in one institution (the international human rights system)100 marks the development of 
the norm in fundamental terms. How would the prohibition of terrorism have developed if it had 
not been embedded as a principle within the international human rights system, and left as a 
principle respecting solely national and international security? The fact—that a significant number 
of newly formed states rejected criminalising terrorism out of concern that they would criminalise 
the struggle against colonisation, ie, rejected criminalising terrorism because this criminalisation 
                                            
94 D’Amato, above n 80, 195–198. See Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 95, Conclusion 8, Commentary 
[3]: “A relatively small number of States engaging in a certain practice might thus suffice if indeed such 
practice, as well as other States’ inaction in response, is generally accepted as law” (emphasis added). Note how 
this contributes to the characterisation of the work of the legal authority official, when it ascertains the 
existence of a rule, as politico-legal rather than a sociological exercise: see above n 79. 
95 D’Amato, ibid 199-215. Cf with T M Franck and D M Sughrue, ‘The International Role of Equity-as-
Fairness’ (1992) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 563–596. 
96 See Elster on the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”: J Elster, Deliberative Democracy, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), especially 111 (Publicity of the debates foster the replacement of language of interest by 
the language of reason).   
97 See below n 142 and accompanying text. 
98 Higgins, above n 3, (1963) 2. See also Alvarez, above n 19, chapters 3 and 4. 
99 See above n 53 and accompanying text 
100 For all, see Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, GA Res 60/288, UN GAOR, 60th sess, 99th pln mtg, UN 
Doc A/RES/60/288 (8 September 2006), preamble: “Reaffirming that acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and democracy”. 
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would undermine the principle of self-determination101—suggests an answer to the former 
question. 
Moreover, although formal institutions and organs are involved with formation of CIL, the 
latter constitutes an informal process. Indeed, international organs have their own mandates and 
often such mandates do not involve the task of fomenting the creation of CIL. Although certain 
organs have mandates that are broad enough to encompass the promotion of the formation of 
CIL,102 the process of formation is, in itself, informal—suffice to contrast it to the process of 
drafting, signing and ratifying treaties. In this perspective, I argue that the different mandates and 
structures of UN organs allow them to weigh in at different stages of the formation of CIL. For 
instance, although the nascent norm (eg, prohibition of apartheid, prohibition of torture) becomes 
part of institutions that may be highly formalised (Special Committee Against Apartheid, 
Committee Against Torture), the crystallisation of the norm as CIL is informal. In this process, 
different organs display different levels of potential in influencing different stages in the emergence 
of the norms as rules of CIL: the GA, inter alia, firmly fixed both prohibitions as norms, deeply 
enshrined them within the normative structure that arises from the UN Charter and provided ample 
legitimacy to the work of other organs, including other principal organs (whose mandates are more 
specialised); the Committees were thus capable of clarifying the scope of the prohibitions and were 
crucial in giving salience to noncompliance and generating social pressure.103 On this note, I argue 
that institutionalisation of a norm strengthens it and has a strong effect on the behaviour and 
attitude of states. Consequently, institutionalisation may promote the formation of new CIL. These 
processes are “consciously deliberative”104 and path-dependent.105 However, neither an external 
observer nor the actors involved in the processes are capable of foreseeing or securing the emergence 
of the crystallisation of CIL.106  
Evidently, certain organs of the state and IOs may understand that their decisions and 
actions may either improve or jeopardise the potential of the norm to become CIL. This allows 
them to act strategically. For instance, in January 1987, the President of the United States decided 
not to seek the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
                                            
101 See, generally, B Saul, ‘Definition of “Terrorism” in the UN Security Council: 1985–2004’ (2005) 4 
Chinese Journal of International Law 141–66. 
102 Such as the UNGA. See Charter, art 13(1)(a). 
103 Similarly, SC has more potential to affect some stages than others. See section 3.2.1 below. 
104 See above n 19 and accompanying text. 
105 See above n 53 and accompanying text. 
106 See Droubi, above n 31. 
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Convention.107 The US Government acknowledged that “like all other efforts associated with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross” Protocol I “had certain meritorious elements”.108 
However, it asserted that “Protocol I is fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed”.109 The President 
lamented that the document should be rejected.110 Nevertheless, the Government could “devise 
an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of real humanitarian 
benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed conflicts”.111 The US Government 
intended to initiate consultations with its allies “to develop appropriate methods for incorporating these 
positive provisions into rules that govern our military operation, with the intention that they shall in 
time win recognition as customary international law separate from their presence in Protocol I”.112 While 
the US Government intended to promote the collective institutionalisation of the provisions with 
the purpose of crystallising them as CIL, it could not guarantee that the objective would be 
attained. Hence, the point is that these organs may only hope to be able to affect the behaviour and 
the attitude of states. Depending on how much the behaviour and attitude of the latter changes, 
the new norms may acquire the character of CIL. 
Nevertheless, it is possible, based on the above, to suggest some criteria for the identification 
of norms with the potential to become CIL. I argue that a norm displays this potential if it matches 
the normative framework of strong and well-established regimes, drawing significantly from their 
legitimacy and authority; when the norm does not challenge the expectations of states in manners 
that trigger the termination of the process of its own evolution, and when it is promoted through 
the combined efforts of organs of states and IOs.  
                                            
107 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 7 December 1979). 
108 United States, ‘Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol n II Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed 
Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977’, Senate, 100th Congress, 1st sess (29 January 1987), Treaty 
Doc 100-2, iii. 
109  Ibid. 
110 Ibid iv. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid x (emphasis added). See also T Meron et al, ‘Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Future Directions in Light of the US Decision 
Not to Ratify’ (1987) 81 American Society of International Law Proceedings 26. (The panel formed by scholars, 
ICRC representatives and US officials discussed the reasons and implications of the decision of the US 
Government. Speaking on their individual capacity, US officials had the opportunity to identify the 
“meritorious provisions” of Protocol I that deserved becoming customary law). 
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3.  Institutionalisation through the Resolutions and operational activities of the 
political organs of the UN 
Looking back at Higgins’ Method VI and Charney’s outline, and drawing on the above, I suggest 
that UN resolutions and activities may intervene in the formation of CIL, inter alia, as follows: (a) 
in their daily activities UN subsidiary organs and procedures may articulate a new prescription of 
behaviour, which (b) UN resolutions introduce as a norm to the international community; (c) UN 
organs may direct their subsidiary organs with the task of monitoring compliance with the norm 
and reporting back; (d) subsidiary, specialised organs intervene to appraise the behaviour and 
attitude of states in respect to the norm and make recommendations for the political organs to 
adopt in order to strengthen the norm; (e) their reports may be taken up by the principal organs, 
which may adopt more specific resolutions to tackle noncompliant behaviour; (f) UN organs may 
function as legal authorities and affirm the norm as CIL in judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and 
political resolutions. Note that this outline clarifies that resolutions may have three distinct 
functions: introduction and fixation of a new norm (item ‘a’), fine-tuning of compliance-inducing 
mechanisms (‘e’) and affirmation of a new CIL (‘f’).113 Empirically, an observer should expect to 
verify that organs of the UN are in continuous contact with the organs of other IOs and of the 
states; and that states respond to the resolutions and activities either by adapting their behaviour 
to the norm or justifying their noncompliant behaviour. 114 What follows is an attempt to unfold 
this issue. 
 
3.1. Emergence of new CIL: from the articulation of prescriptions of behaviour to the 
promotion of norms  
UN subsidiary organs define problems, frame solutions, articulate prescriptions, introduce these 
prescriptions as norms to the international community, clarify and promote the norms. Because 
                                            
113 Cf with Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 106, Conclusion 12(2): “A resolution … may provide 
evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or 
contribute to its development”.  
114 Hence, these activities do not serve only to “catalyse” state practice: they may, in fact, mould state 
practice because they may affect the identity of the states, the manner by which they define their own 
interests. Cf with Alvarez, above n 19, 258: “Describing GA or ILO resolutions as potential catalysts 
for generating customary law, perhaps the most popular way of describing their legal effect, does not 
begin to describe the diverse declarative, interpretative, condemnatory, or other functions of this kind 
of IO action”. In contrast, M Wood, Third Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur on Identification of Customary 
International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/682 (27 March 2015) [75]: “the conduct of international 
organizations may serve to catalyse state practice … may prompt reactions by states, which may count 
as practice or attest to their legal opinions”. In the same vein, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 89–
90, Conclusion 4(3), Commentary, [9]; and 108, Conclusion 12, Commentary [7]. 
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these activities are orientated at problem-solving, the type of prescriptions that they articulate often 
stretch the predominant understanding of the ‘limits of the law’. For instance, recall the efforts of 
the 1998 working group on business and human rights, which the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established in response to multiplying reports of 
human rights abuses in the context of business activities, particularly within the extractive 
industries.115 The Sub-Commission was composed of experts from different regions who acted on 
their personal capacity, and it constituted the main subsidiary organ of the Commission on Human 
Rights (‘CHR’).116 The working group submitted to the UN Sub-Commission in 2003, the so-called 
draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights, which the Sub-Commission adopted.117 The document “solemnly proclaims these 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights and urges that every effort be made so that they become generally 
known and respected”.118 The 2003 Draft Norms were received with disapproval by the CHR119 
which, as widely known, constituted a (political) subsidiary organ of the UN with a specific 
mandate (the promotion and protection of human rights). In fact, the refusal of the CHR to 
endorse the 2003 Draft Norms greatly jeopardised the evolution of the prescriptions-norms 
enshrined in that document.120 This example makes clear that a subsidiary organ (in this case, the 
Sub-Commission) may find room to define problems and push new prescriptions of behaviour 
forward; it also shows that new prescriptions that challenge firmly established politico-legal 
                                            
115 D Weissbrodt and M Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97(4) The American Journal of International Law 
901–922; J G Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: the Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 The 
American Journal of International Law 819–820. 
116 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (UN/2017) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SC/Pages/SubCommission.aspx>. 
117 ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights’, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th 
sess, Agenda Item 4, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub 2/2003/12/Rev 2 (26 August 2003). (Hereinafter the ‘2003 
Draft Norms’) 
118 Ibid Preamble. 
119 Ruggie, above n 115, 819–820. 
120 However, this did stop NGOs and norm-entrepreneurs from promoting the 2003 Draft Norms outside 
the umbrella of the CHR. See J G Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, Norton 
Global Ethics Series (WW Norton & Company, 2013) 47–55 (The author explains the merits and flaws 
of the 2003 Draft Norms and his personal difficulty to free his mandate from the “shadow cast over it by 
the Norms”, at 54). 
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frameworks risk rejection by the political organs, especially if the procedure adopted for their 
formulation is perceived to be flawed.121  
 
3.1.1.  Resolutions and specific activities  
Moreover, the example also shows that new prescriptions do not automatically transform into norms 
and, least of all, into legal rules. Should the 2003 Draft Norms have made its way to the text of a 
resolution of the CHR, the resolution in question would have presented the prescriptions enshrined 
therein as valid social norms to the international community: the text of the 2003 Draft Norms 
(“solemnly proclaims these Norms on…”) did not leave margin for doubt in this regard.122 
Evidently, this would not have prevented states, notably those who eventually had voted against 
the adoption of the resolution, from rejecting the Draft Norms as valid social norms. In any case, 
the adoption of the resolution would have probably pushed the evolution of the Draft Norms 
further.123 Hence, resolutions of political organs may serve to provide evidence that norms have 
emerged.124  
Hence, depending on the manner in which the prescription evolves, whether it triggers the 
emergence of a norm, and whether the norm acquires law character, the whole process may 
characterise, in hindsight, informal law-making.125 Indeed, years later, another effort led by John 
Ruggie, conducted with the full support of the political organs of the UN and through a complex 
consultative process with states, businesses and other NSAs, produced the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (‘GPBHR’), which the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) endorsed through 
                                            
121 See Ruggie, above n 120, 53 (Describing that the 2003 Draft Norms “pleased human rights NGOs but 
surprised governments and business because no intergovernmental body had approved them, nor had 
any government ratified them … The UN Human Rights Commission resolved any possible confusion 
by stating in a formal resolution that the Norms had no legal standing”. 
122 See above n 118 and accompanying text). 
123 Despite their rejection by the CHR, the 2003 Draft Norms continued to affect the debate on the topic 
among the different stakeholders, notably NGOs. Ultimately, John Ruggie had to clearly break with 
them. As he explains: “By now it had become clear that only a clean break would free my mandate from 
the shadow cast over it by the [2003 Draft] Norms … in the words of Edward Mortimer … I committed 
‘Normicide’”.  In Ruggie, above n 120, 54. 
124 Finnemore and Sikkink, above n 34, 892: “We can only have indirect evidence of norms just as we can 
only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for 
example)”. 
125 See the landmark study Alvarez, above n 19, 262 (The author concludes that “IO organs, not just select 
few, [act] as law-makers in some sense, even though few of them are given explicit authority to legislate 
or to recommend”).  
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a resolution,126 formally presenting the principles as valid social norms. It is important to note the 
impossibility of pinpointing the instant at which a norm emerges—in fact, it seems that all one 
can hope is to find cues of its emergence.127 As Finnemore and Sikkink explain, “norms prompt 
justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can 
study.”128 A resolution that clearly affirms a norm may constitute a strong cue that such a norm 
has emerged or is emerging within the community of states and IOs. Evidently, much will depend 
on the circumstances of its adoption and the respective vote tally: it is submitted that a resolution 
that is widely supported, notably if it takes the shape of a declaration,129 may provide strong 
evidence of the emergence of the norms, which the resolution affirms. Besides, although not legally 
binding, these resolutions often promote the inversion of the burden of proof in favour of the 
emerging norms.130 They may also establish an institutional environment that fosters compliance 
with these norms.131  
Resolutions of this type likewise have the effect of triggering processes of clarification and 
promotion of the norm. Indeed, the work of the Commission on the Racial Situation on the 
Republic of South Africa and the Special Committee Against Apartheid were instrumental for the 
understanding of the meaning of apartheid because the organs made the practices of apartheid 
                                            
126 Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, HRC Res 17/4, 33rd mtg, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (16 June 2011) (Adopted without vote) [1] (hereinafter ‘HRC Res 17/4’). See 
Ruggie, above n 120, 141 et seq (describing his efforts to secure the legitimacy of the consultative process 
he had carried out) and 157–159 (describing his efforts to secure the endorsement of the GPBHR by 
the HRC). 
127 In fact, Ruggie argues that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights already existed as a 
“well-established social norm”, and that all that the Framework and the GPBHR did was to provide “a 
more precise and commonly accepted definition of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
what specific measures it entails, and how it can be linked more effectively with public-law construction 
of internationally recognised rights”. See Ruggie, above n 120, 91. 
128 Finnemore and Sikkink, above n 34, 892. 
129 Commission on Human Rights, “Use of the Terms ‘Declaration’ and ‘Recommendation’”, 
Memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs to the Commission on Human Rights, 18th sess, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/L.610 (2 April 1962) 1-2: “In United Nations practice, a ‘declaration’ is a formal and solemn 
instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being 
enunciated”. Illustrating, Ruggie sought an endorsement by the HRC through a resolution adopted by 
consensus (without a vote). See above n 126 and accompanying text. 
130 See above n 97 and below 142, and accompanying text. Also, Ruggie, above n 120, 124: “The 
endorsement by states … gives official recognition to a norm that was previously grounded only in the 
realm of social expectations” and 157: “Strong Human Rights Council backing for the Guiding 
Principles was necessary for them to take root. Without it they would merely constitute yet another 
initiative vying for attention in a crowded field where none had reached scale”. 
131 For instance, UN HRC Res 17/4 established a Working Group and a Forum on Business and Human 
Rights. See HRC Res 17/4, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4, [6]–[17]. 
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clear.132 Hence, they clarified the scope of the norm prohibiting it. While an HRC resolution 
endorsed the GPBHR, the meaning of the principles has become clear through the continued 
activities of subsidiary organs of the UN,133 who often work with and provide assistance to 
domestic organs. Furthermore, this type of resolution, and the activities that it triggers, may 
strengthen the legitimacy of the new norm.134 Castañeda made a major contribution to this aspect 
by clarifying the importance of UN activities in giving an opportunity to developing states to 
participate in the processes of emergence of new CIL.135 The same argument is made by Alvarez, 
who notes that, in addition, IOs have fostered the legitimacy of NSA to influence law-making 
processes.136  
In addition, this type of resolution may have the effect of reversing the burden of proof. In 
this respect, Asamoah noted that there was a substantial difference between saying that resolutions 
of the GA had no binding effect, and saying that they had no legal effect: the scope of legal effect 
is, pursuant to him, broader than that of binding effect—and the latter is one aspect of the 
former.137 For example, in 2001, the International Law Commission held a debate about the 
ultimate recommendation that, under article 23(1) of its Statute,138 it should present to the GA in 
respect to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.139 While some members supported the adoption 
of an international convention, others preferred the Assembly take note of the Draft Articles or 
adopt it in a resolution; and a third group suggested the Assembly adopt the text of the Articles in 
a declaration.140 Some of those who rejected the form of a treaty asserted that a “resolution or 
declaration adopted unanimously would be more effective than a convention adopted after many years of 
                                            
132 Droubi, above n 31, 91 et seq. A Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid 
(Cornell University Press, 1999) 39–54. 
133 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx>. 
134 Indeed, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 255 [70] (“a 
series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of 
a new rule”). 
135 Castañeda, above n 82, 38–48. 
136 Alvarez, above n 19, 610–612.  
137 O Asamoah, ‘The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly’ (1963) 3 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 210. 
138 Statute of the ILC art 23(1): “The Commission may recommend to the General Assembly: (a) To take 
no action, the report having already been published; (b) To take note of or adopt the report by 
resolution; (c) To recommend the draft to Members with a view to the conclusion of a convention; (d) 
To convoke a conference to conclude a convention”. 
139 ‘Chapter IV: State Responsibility’ [2001] II (2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 20, 24-25. 
140 Ibid 24 [61]. 
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preparatory work and ratified by a small number of states”.141 They claimed that such an act of the 
Assembly “would be seen as an authoritative study” that “would effectively place the burden on opposing 
states to prove that it was not binding” and that it would have a “decisive impact on international 
relations and the conduct of states, as evidenced by the jurisprudence of ICJ”.142 As it is widely 
known, the Commission finally recommended that the Assembly take note of the Draft Articles 
and annexed their text to the resolution.  
 
3.1.2.  Norm-entrepreneurship  
Likewise, at this stage organs and norm-entrepreneurs work on building the legitimacy of the 
norms. As already noted, the Secretary-General is the norm-entrepreneur par excellence of the UN 
system.143 Other actors, such as special procedures and members of subsidiary organs, may play 
that role as well—as the work of Eleanor Roosevelt and John Ruggie in the promotion of the 
UDHR and the GPBHR show. Norm-entrepreneurs make some arguments more salient. They 
may, for instance, justify the new norms as necessary for the task of pursuing the purposes and 
objectives of the UN. The higher the legitimacy that the new norm acquires, the lower the 
legitimacy that older norms with which the new norms may be at odds, retain. Norm-entrepreneurs 
often need to counter prevailing understandings. For instance, the strengthening of the UDHR 
and of the prohibition of apartheid implicated the weakening of state-centred and contractualist 
approaches to international law.144 A similar process may be in motion in respect to the GPBHE: 
as they become stronger, older paradigms, such as the impossibility of NSA to have rights and 
obligations in international law, weaken.  
 
3.1.3.  The Secretariat-General and CIL  
While the Secretary-General may function as norm-entrepreneur, the activities of the Secretariat-
General may serve to institutionalise the emerging rule.145 The Secretariat provides “the necessary 
                                            
141 Ibid 24 [64] (emphasis added). 
142 Ibid (emphasis added). 
143 See generally, Schachter (1948) above n 83; Johnstone, above n 85; Droubi, above n 31. 
144 See Droubi, above n 31, 91–95. 
145 Similarly, Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 89, Conclusion 4, Commentary [6]: “The practice of 
secretariats of international organizations when serving as treaty depositaries, in deploying military 
forces … or in taking positions on the scope of privileges and immunities … might contribute to the 
formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law in those areas”. However, note the 
caveat the ILC makes, and which I argue should not apply to the ascertainment of the formation of a 
rule: “The acts of international organizations that are not functionally equivalent to the acts of states are 
unlikely to be relevant practice” in ibid (emphasis added). 
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lubricant in international machinery as well as an indispensable memory” to the other organs.146 It 
comprises an international staff of more than 40,000 members based in different offices around 
the world and is responsible for a range of duties. Moreover, it counts on an impressive network 
of professionals and non-governmental organizations capable of providing assistance with respect 
to monitoring, reporting and administering technical support to states. Its work involves preparing 
documents in different languages, carrying out analysis (much of which requires detailed research), 
providing the means for monitoring situations on the ground, preparing reports, and making 
recommendations. In contrast with the personal involvement of the Secretary, a more nuanced 
manner of construing problems, framing solutions, and articulating and fixing the meaning of 
norms occurs in the ordinary work of the staff. Indeed, members of the Secretariat “very quickly 
become the rare experts on what specific activities the UN and member governments 
undertake”.147 Consequently they can “insert a particular tone in the proceedings and on many 
occasions quietly inject their thought or take the initiative in offering government representatives 
ideas and data for mapping an altered or, for that matter, unchanged course.”148 
Hence, the Secretariat can embed the emerging norm in different manners into its activities 
and the activities of the UN organs and agencies. Evidently, it is constrained by the expectations 
of the UN organs and those of the states. Nevertheless, it has enough room to promote a norm 
through different channels. 
 
3.2.  Cascade: managing compliance 
Higgins was right when she noticed a thin distance between compliance and opinio juris. However, 
not all compliance-inducing mechanisms aim at moulding the attitude of the state—while some 
mechanisms clearly aim at persuading states, others aim at changing their behaviour by relying 
either on instruments that create social pressures or on instruments of material sanctions and 
rewards.149 In the last two cases, the change of attitude may arise, but the main objective is the 
changing of behaviour. Nevertheless, pursuant to the principle of inertia,150 the observer can 
                                            
146 L Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat (Routledge, 2010) 18. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 A Chayes and A H Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1995); R Goodman and D 
Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (Oxford University Press,  2013), 
and T Risse, S C Ropp, and K Sikkink (eds), The persistent power of human rights: From commitment to compliance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
150 C Perelman, The New Rhetoric (Springer, 1971) 105; I G M Scobbie, ‘The Approach to International 
Customary Law in the Study’ in E Wilmshurst and S Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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reasonably expect that the behaviour prescribed or proscribed by the norm, once adopted or 
abandoned by the state, will remain adopted or abandoned because another change in behaviour 
will demand further justification.  
In this framework, it is necessary to recall that UN organs may manage compliance-inducing 
mechanisms with the purpose of attaining acceptable levels of compliance. The managerial 
approach to compliance, so much in vogue now,151 was articulated by Chayes and Chayes in a 
landmark study that evidenced that UN organs make strategic use of different instruments to 
promote compliance with norms.152 This sheds some light on the concept of promulgative 
articulation of the norm: The sole fact that a resolution declares a new norm may, in theory, be 
enough for informing states that, thenceforth, their behaviour regarding the new norm will be 
subject of review. However, in practice, that is hardly enough to secure compliance, and it is 
important that the resolution in question establishes mechanisms of monitoring and reporting, 
which will give salience to non-compliant behaviour and enable criticism to arise. At this moment, 
the resolutions and activities of the UNSC become of fundamental importance.  
 
3.2.1.  The SC and development of CIL  
The specific mandate and structure of the SC create a normative challenge and democratic deficit 
that make it difficult for the organ to influence the formation of CIL153—insofar as the definition 
of CIL is consistent with the mainstream definition.154 Indeed, these factors jeopardise the 
potential of SC resolutions to reflect general practice and opinio juris. In contrast, some factors seem 
to improve that potential, at least prima facie. Article 24 sets forth that the organ acts on behalf of 
all UN members, and articles 25 and 39 enable the organ to adopt—and enforce—mandatory 
                                            
151 M Doelle, ‘The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experiment?’ (2016) 6 Climate 
Law 1, 3 (The author contrasts the Kyoto Protocol with the Paris Agreement, highlighting that the latter is: 
“based on the idea that nation states can be moved toward action in the global interest through 
managerial approaches that build new norms of state behaviour. This managerial approach is based on 
transparency, a clear articulation of the collective goal, attention to the state of the science, and 
opportunities for interaction and information sharing, along with the flexibility to adjust to changing 
circumstances”). 
152 Chayes and Chayes, above n 149. 
153 See, for all, the important contribution by O Corten, ‘La Participation du Conseil de Sécurité à l’ 
Élaboration, à la Cristallisation où à la Consolidation des Règles Coutumières’ (2004) 37 Revue Belge de 
Droit International 552–566. (The author adopts a cautious approach to the topic, does not deny the 
potential that the organ has to affect the development of CIL, but rejects the characterisation of the SC 
as a type of “international jury, apte à se prononcer sur la création ou la réforme des règles juridiques les 
plus fondamentales du droit international”).   
154 As it is reflected in Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10.  
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resolutions. In addition, the SC has developed the practice of adopting quasi-legislative resolutions, 
and of imposing the same type of obligations on states and NSAs in similar contexts. Both 
practices may give rise to generalisable rules. However, acting on behalf of all UN members 
cannot, in itself, provide evidence that states view the obligations, which the SC imposes, as CIL. 
Invoking the ability that the SC has to impose material sanctions will hardly help: states may 
comply without being convinced that they are legally required, least of all under CIL, to do so. 
Furthermore, when a significant number of states reject SC attempts to enforce its prior decisions, 
the states—rather than the organ—prevail.155 Even when the SC ‘legislates’, it—by definition—
cannot create CIL because written laws do not automatically create CIL.156 Evidently, if states fail 
to protest resolutions of the SC, their failure may eventually be deemed to constitute acquiescence, 
which may constitute a crucial factor in the generation of new CIL.157 However, I argue that it is 
not only SC resolutions—and least of all only certain types of its resolutions—that can have this 
effect on the formation of CIL. In fact, it seems plausible to attribute the same potential to 
resolutions of the other UN political organs.  
The present work offers an alternative approach that permits overcoming these challenges. 
Indeed, I suggest that we drop the rather formalistic approach that attempts to ascertain the effect 
of SC resolutions on the formation of CIL. Instead, I propose to ascertain the effect that the 
resolutions and activities have—not directly on CIL but—on the evolution and strengthening of 
specific norms. Broadly speaking, as the resolutions of all UN political organs, SC resolutions may 
introduce new norms, fine-tune the mechanisms for managing compliance with it and affirm that 
a norm is CIL. However, the major role that the SC performs in promoting a norm is by managing 
compliance through fixing the meaning of specific aspects of the norm; the monitoring of 
compliance with it, and the provision of technical assistance to organs of states. Indeed, the SC 
has developed complex institutions, in the form of Sanctions Committees, which are capable of 
inducing compliance. These institutions begin by identifying cases of non-compliance and the 
reasons for non-compliance. This allows them to go much further than the mere employment of 
material sanctions. They employ instruments of persuasion and the provision of technical 
                                            
155 K Tshibangu, ‘La Décision de l’OUA de ne Plus Respecter les Sanctions Décrétées par l’ONU Contre 
la Libye: Désobéissance Civile des Etats Africains à l’Égard de l’ONU’ (1999) 32 Revue Belge de Droit 
International 545. Generally, S Droubi, Resisting United Nations Security Council Resolutions (Routledge, 2014), 
chapters 3, 6, and 10. 
156 For all, see Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 102, Conclusion 11. 
157 Alvarez underlines that “at a minimum [SC resolutions] impose on those resisting such action the 
considerable burden of showing why something that was permissible previously is now either unwise 
or illegal” (Alvarez, above n 19, 194). Again, resolutions of the other UN organs may create the same 
burden on recalcitrant states. 
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assistance in order to tackle cases of non-compliance. For example, the SC established a sanctions 
regime to counter the financing of terrorism. This regime promoted the clarification of the 
meaning of the prohibition of terrorism in different, and unexpected, manners: on the one hand, 
it made it clear that the prohibition of terrorism included prohibition of any form of financing of 
terrorism; on the other, the challenges that the sanctions regime faced promoted the clarification 
of the relationship between the prohibition of terrorism with fundamental rights of individuals 
suspected of involvement with the financing of terrorism. To an extent, this regime has also been 
successful in monitoring and managing state compliance. Whether, in a specific given case, the 
Sanctions Committee contributes to changing the behaviour and attitude of states, and bringing 
them to comply, implement and support the norm in question—is a crucial empirical question that 
must be answered through case studies. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework above provides 
the student with the instruments necessary to ascertain, in empirical terms, the weight that the SC 
resolutions and activities have in the evolution of norms.158 
 
3.3. Late cascade of the new norm: affirming CIL 
Within the UN, the most obvious organ that serves as legal authority is the International Court of 
Justice. However, others may play the same role: the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda constituting easy examples. 
Nevertheless, political organs, notably principal political organs, may play this same role through 
certain types of resolutions. Rarely will a resolution bluntly and plainly affirm that a norm is a rule 
of CIL—and it may in fact state the opposite.159 In some circumstances, it may affirm that a norm 
is CIL without mentioning but merely implying that character.160 However, in exceptional 
circumstances, it may in fact affirm a norm as CIL.161 All UN political organs may function as 
                                            
158 Likewise, human rights treaty-bodies had been performing a similar role in the promotion of norms 
and fomenting of pressure on states. Notably, see the three stages of the life of the Commission on 
Human Rights (diffusion and standard-setting; monitoring; provision of technical assistance). To the 
same effect, new and more complex mechanisms have been employed by the UN HRC (Universal 
Periodic Review, Complaint Procedure, Special Procedures). Generally, A Clapham, Human Rights—A 
Very Short Story (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
159 See, for example, SC Res 1816, UN SCOR, 63rd sess, 5902nd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008) 
[9] (stating that certain decisions made in the resolution did not constitute CIL). This resolution 
concerned Somalia and the same caveat was made in following resolutions in the same series. 
160 The Crime of Genocide, GA Res 96(I), UN GAOR, 1st sess, 55th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/96(I) (11 
December 1946) first operative paragraph: “Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law”. 
161 In a number of resolutions, the GA affirmed that prohibition of torture is jus cogens and the prohibition 
of cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, CIL. For instance, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 60/148, UN GAOR, 60 sess, 64th plen mtg, Agenda Item 
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legal-authority in respect to the formal ascertainment of a norm as CIL. Indeed, the SC has 
affirmed that the “principle … concerning the non-use of weapons against” aircraft in flight 
constituted CIL,162 and that the use of chemical, biological, or toxic weapons constitute a violation 
of CIL.163 However, this is different from the formal introduction of the norm to the international 
community that occurs at an earlier stage (emergence).164 For instance, the GA adopted the UDHR 
and the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space.165 When the GA adopted these Declarations it formally presented the norms enshrined 
thereunder to the international community and this triggered a plethora of activities within the 
UN. At the moment of their adoption, it is highly questionable whether the GA and states saw the 
norms in question as CIL.166 Hence, despite “solemnly declaring” those norms, the GA did 
something different from when it affirmed and strongly implied that, respectively, the prohibition 
of torture (and of cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment) and the crime of genocide were CIL. 
The latter resolutions reflect a more mature stage in the life-cycle of the norms.  
4. Conclusion 
This work began by recalling Higgins’ ‘methods’ though which states come to be bound by new 
norms. It emphasised two particular methods and, drawing on Charney’s template, built on them 
to systematise the description of the formation of CIL and understand the importance that UN 
institutions play in promoting formation. It became clear that UN organs and institutions are 
capable of coordinating with state organs in the definition of problems and articulation of new 
prescriptions of behaviour. In these processes, states learn to identify problems as the latter are 
                                            
71(a), UN Doc A/RES/60/148 (16 December 2005) preamble: “the prohibition of torture is a 
peremptory norm of international law and … the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment is customary international law”. 
162 SC Res 1067, UN SCOR, 51st sess, 3683rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1067 (26 July 1996) preamble, [6]. 
163 SC Res 620, UN SCOR, 43rd sess, 2825th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/620 (26 August 1988) [2]. Note the 
strong mandate that this resolution ascribes to the SG to monitor cases of violation. 
164 See above n 128 and 129 and accompanying text. 
165 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, GA Res 
1962 (XVIII), UN GAOR, 28th sess, 1280th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/1962(XVIII) (13 December 
1963). 
166 B Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?’, 
Studies in International Space Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) 138 et seq. However, this type of 
resolution may crystallise general principles of law. The confusion seems to arise whenever the scholar 
reduces the weight of the material element of the concept of custom. See B Simma and P Alston, ‘The 
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, 12 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 102. Contrast with Cheng, ibid. Hence, whilst the Declarations referred to above did 
not generate (instant) CIL, they may have ‘promulgated’ general principles of law. 
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defined by organs of the UN. States learn to accept that the prescriptions of behaviour, which UN 
organs put forward, ought to be observed. Placed within their respective institutional frameworks, 
resolutions may have different effects for the evolution of the norm and its acquisition of CIL 
character. Indeed, resolutions may introduce the new norm, establish institutions that manage 
compliance with it, and affirm that it is CIL. In addition, increasingly specialised institutions may 
be involved in securing compliance with the new norm. The whole picture makes clear that the 
UN Charter offers a strong normative force, and the UN is a strong institutional reality, from which 
new norms may draw legitimacy. Based on the above, it seems possible to argue that norms that 
draw on the Charter are promoted through coherent efforts by the UN organs and do not overtly 
challenge the expectations of states that have potential to become CIL. Further studies are 
necessary to clarify specific topics—notably, the contribution that complex regimes’ theories may 
help studies that purport to ascertain the role of domestic state and non-state actors in the 
formation of international norms,167 the impact of rapid onset events on the formation of CIL,168 
and the different roles that the SC may play in fomenting the formation of CIL.169 Besides, further 
research may look at whether the UN, through the imposition of obligations on non-state actors, 
is promoting the emergence of a new paradigm in international law, which would make it possible 
to attribute rights and obligations to such actors.170 
Finally, the paper began with quotations of two ILC Conclusions and feels it should end by 
returning to them. Generally, the present work supports both Conclusions. However, some 
considerations are necessary. Although the Draft Conclusions formally aim at facilitating the 
identification of CIL, they cannot avoid the question of its formation.171 Given the above, the 
expression “in certain cases” that opens Conclusion 4(2) seems too restrictive in respect to 
“formation” of CIL.172 I would suggest that the ILC revisit this Conclusion and drops that 
expression altogether. Further, I would suggest that, in the respective Commentary, the ILC 
emphasises that the ascertainment of the contribution of IOs to the formation of CIL requires 
empirical evidence on a case-by-case basis. Likewise, the present work largely supports Conclusion 
                                            
167 See above n 51 and accompanying text. 
168 See above n 88  and accompanying text. 
169 See section 3.2.1 above. 
170 See sections 3.1 and 3.1.1 above. 
171 Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10, 81, Conclusion 1, Commentary [4]: “The draft conclusions thus 
inevitably refer in places to the formation of rules; they do not, however, deal systematically with how 
rules emerge, or how they change or terminate”. 
172  Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/7/10, 76 [62], Conclusion 4(2): “In certain cases, the practice of 
international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary 
international law”. 
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12(2).173 This having been said, I would suggest that resolutions contribute not only to the 
“development” but also to the “formation” of CIL. Having referred to “formation” of CIL in 
other tracts of the Draft Conclusions, the ILC could add the word to Conclusion 12(2). 
 
                                            
173  Ibid 78 [62], Conclusion 12(2): “A resolution adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference may provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule 
of customary international law, or contribute to its development”. 
